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Abstract
Increased coupling between critical infrastructure networks, such as power and com-
munication systems, will have important implications for the reliability and security of
these systems. To understand the effects of power-communication coupling, several
have studied interdependent network models and reported that increased coupling can
increase system vulnerability. However, these results come from models that have sub-
stantially different mechanisms of cascading, relative to those found in actual power
and communication networks. This paper reports on two sets of experiments that com-
pare the network vulnerability implications resulting from simple topological models
and models that more accurately capture the dynamics of cascading in power systems.
First, we compare a simple model of topological contagion to a model of cascading in
power systems and find that the power grid shows a much higher level of vulnerability,
relative to the contagion model. Second, we compare a model of topological cascades
in coupled networks to three different physics-based models of power grids coupled
to communication networks. Again, the more accurate models suggest very different
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conclusions. In all but the most extreme case, the physics-based power grid models
indicate that increased power-communication coupling decreases vulnerability. This is
opposite from what one would conclude from the coupled topological model, in which
zero coupling is optimal. Finally, an extreme case in which communication failures
immediately cause grid failures, suggests that if systems are poorly designed, increased
coupling can be harmful. Together these results suggest design strategies for reducing
the risk of cascades in interdependent infrastructure systems.
Introduction
Understanding the reliability and security implications of increased coupling between interde-
pendent power, water, transportation and communication infrastructure systems is critical,
given the vital services that these infrastructures provide and continuing threats posed by
natural disasters and terrorist attacks (1, 2). This is particularly true for the coupling be-
tween electric power and communications networks, given the essential nature of electric
power to modern societies, the rapid growth of smart grid technology (3), and the poten-
tial for cascading failure to lead to catastrophic blackouts (4). Smart grid systems, such
as Advanced Metering Infrastructure and microprocessor-based controls, can be valuable
tools for mitigating these risks (5). But automation can also introduce new failures mecha-
nisms: cyber-attacks may reach a larger number of critical components (6) and outages may
propagate between the connected networks, increasing the risk of massive failures.
In order to quantify the risks and benefits of network interdependency, models are needed
that at least approximately represent the potential for cascading within a power grid, as well
as between power and communication networks. A variety of models have been suggested
for understanding the mechanisms by which failures, ideas, and diseases propagate within
individual networks (7,8,9).Simple models clearly show that different types of networks can
respond very differently to random failures and volitional attacks (10,11,12). Subsequently,
several have suggested that contagion-style models be used to understand vulnerability in
power grids (13,14,15,16).
However, power grids differ in important ways from these simple models. In a contagion-
style model, failures propagate locally: when component i fails, the next component to fail
is topologically connected to i. On the other hand, power grids are engineered networks,
in which energy flows from generators to loads through power lines (edges), each of which
has a limit on the amount of electrical flow it can tolerate. When node (substation) or edge
(transmission line) failures occur, power re-routes according to Kirchhoff’s and Ohm’s laws.
This re-routing increases flows along parallel paths, which can subsequently trigger long
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chains of component failures, potentially leading to a wide-area blackout (4). As a result
of this process, failures propagate non-locally: the next component to fail may be hundreds
of miles or tens of edges distant from the previous failure. Thus, overly simple topological
models can lead to misleading conclusions (17) (Figure 1).
A B
12
2
1
3
3
Source
Sink
Figure 1: Comparative illustration of cascade propagation in (A) topologi-
cal contagion and (B) power grid models. In topological models of cascad-
ing, such as the contagion model in (8) or the sandpile model from (18)),
cascades propagate from the initiating failure 1 to neighboring nodes 2
. In a power grid, the initiating failure 1 causes increased loads along
parallel paths 3 , which may subsequently fail (17).
On the other hand, simple models can often suggest new approaches to a particular prob-
lem, particularly when there is limited existing understanding, as is the case with vulnerabil-
ity in interdependent networks. Motivated, at least in part, by increasing interdependency
between power and communications networks, a number of recent studies suggest that inter-
dependency can increase vulnerability in network structures that were otherwise relatively
robust (19, 20, 21, 22). Others have found non-monotonic relationships between the level of
coupling between interdependent networks and network performance, suggesting that there
exists an optimal level of coupling (16, 18). More recent results suggest that under some
conditions, coupling between networks can improve performance (23). While these results
clearly show that coupling is important to the performance of interdependent systems, the
“typical” impact of coupling is not clear. More work is needed to understand the conditions
under which coupling is beneficial, or harmful.
Again, the results above come from models that diverge from real infrastructure net-
works in important ways, making it hard to understand the implications for a particular
system of interest. First, the topological structures found in infrastructure networks differ
notably from standard abstract models (24, 25), largely due to geographic and cost con-
straints (26). Second, the physical mechanisms of cascading within networks (see Figure 1)
and between interdependent networks (see Figure 3) are notably different from those of the
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percolation-style models in (19, 18, 27). Recent results suggest that modeling the physics
of power flows can have important impacts on the conclusions that one would draw from
interdependent infrastructure network models (28,29). In order to understand the extent to
which insights from abstracted network models can be useful for particular types of inter-
dependent networks (such as power and communications networks), comparisons are needed
between simple models and those that more accurately capture the topology, physics, and
coupling of particular infrastructure systems.
Therefore, the goal of this paper is to understand the impact of network topology, cas-
cading mechanisms (physics) and coupling on infrastructure network vulnerability. We use
the case of increased coupling between electric power systems and communication networks
(Smart Grid) as an illustrative test case. Two sets of numerical experiments combine to
address this goal. The first set of experiments focuses on topology and physics. In this ex-
periment we compare the relative vulnerability of different topological structures to random
disturbances given two different models of intra-network cascading: a simple contagion model
and a model that more accurately captures the mechanisms of cascading in power grids. The
second set of experiments compares the impact of increased inter-network interdependency
on vulnerability, given different models cascading failures propagation.
Results
The two sets of results described here describe the vulnerability of different network struc-
tures with different models of cascading to random node failures of various sizes. Each of the
networks was sized to have n = 2383 nodes and m = 2886 links to correspond to the size of
our power grid test system (a model of the Polish system (30)). In each of our experiments
we vary the size of the initiating failure f , which is the ratio of the number of nodes in the
initial random failure to the total number of nodes in the network, n. The ultimate impact
of each cascade is measured by the number of nodes remaining within the largest (giant)
connected component of the graph, |GC|, after the cascade has subsided. We estimated the
vulnerability of each network to initiating failures of different sizes by measuring the prob-
ability that the largest connected connected component in the post-cascade network, GC,
includes more than half of the nodes, i.e., Pr(|GC| > 0.5n).
Intra-network cascading
Our first set of experiments compares the vulnerability of five different network structures
(a power grid, a square lattice, an Erdős-Rényi random graph, a random regular network,
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Figure 2: Robustness of several networks structures to random node fail-
ures, measured by the probability that the post-cascade giant component
includes at least 50% of the network, in (A) a Topological Contagion model
and in a (B) Power Grid cascading model.
and a scale-free network) using the two different models of cascade propagation illustrated
in Figure 1.
Figure 2A shows results from our first model of cascading: a simple model of topological
contagion, proposed by Watts in (8). In this model, after the initial set of ∼ fn node
failures, Node i fails if the fraction of Node i’s neighbors that are in a failed state exceeds
some threshold φi. In these results, each φi was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution
over (0, 1).
Figure 2B shows the results from our second model, which more accurately represents
the dynamics of cascading overloads in a power transmission network. In this power grid
model (31), the failure of edges results in the redistribution of power flows along parallel
paths according to a linearized power flow model (see Materials and Methods). This new
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distribution of flows can cause edges to be overloaded, possibly inducing further edge failures.
If edge failures cause the network to fracture into separate connected components, power
sources (generators) and power sinks (loads) adjust to arrive at a new balance between
supply and demand. Once started, cascades continue until no overloaded edges remain.
These results from these two models show some notable similarities. From both models
of cascading, the power grid and lattice structures appears to be most vulnerable and the
scale-free topology is the most robust. In fact, the relative order of the five networks is nearly
identical in Figures 2A and 2B.
On the other hand, the power grid model accentuates the vulnerability differences among
the different topologies and changes the nature of the transition in p. In the Power Grid
model, we do not observe the rapid, second-order phase transition that is apparent in the
topological model; transitions as f increases are more gradual. Whereas the midpoint of the
transition is similar in the two models (power and topological) for the scale-free network,
the Polish power grid and lattice structures appear to be much more vulnerable from the
perspective of the Power Grid model.
Inter-network cascading
Our second set of experiments explores the impact of interdependency on network vulner-
ability. Specifically, we considered a pair of interdependent networks (a power grid and a
communication network, denoted hereafter by NP and NC , respectively), in which a frac-
tion q (degree of coupling) of the n nodes in NP are coupled to corresponding nodes in NC .
As in the first set of experiments, two different types of models are compared: one that is
purely topological (Figure 3A) and a second that includes additional details about power
flows (Figure 3B).
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Figure 3: Comparative illustration of the (A) “Coupled Topological” model
and the (B) “Non-ideal Smart Grid” model. In the Coupled Topological
model an initiating disturbance 1 causes 2 edge failures in the power
grid as well as 3 node and edge failures in the communications (comm)
network. As a result, the size of the giant component is reduced to 0.8n. In
the Non-ideal Smart Grid (SG) model the initiating failure 1 potentially
causes overloads 4 , which causes an edge failure and 5 a loss of power
at the “sink” node. This may (depending on the availability of backup
power) cause a communication node failure 6 and thus communication
link failures 7 , which fracture the communication network and prevent
messages from being passed from and to the control center.
The first model is an implementation of the interdependent cascade/percolation model
proposed in (19). When a node fails in this model, the associated edges in network NP
and NC immediately fail. If the removed edges result in unconnected clusters in NP (or NC),
then the edges linking the clusters in NC (or NP ) fail. This cascading process continues until
both NC and NP have the same set of clusters. Henceforth, this model will be referred to
as the “Coupled Topological Model” (see Figure 3A).
While it is clear that smart grid will result in some inter-network dependencies, it is
not clear exactly what mechanisms of inter-network cascading will exist as interdependency
increases. Therefore, in a second set of coupled network models, we modeled three different
possibilities for the nature of this coupling. In all three “Smart Grid” models, cascades are
allowed to propagate within the power grid, as in the previous model, with the exception that
the communication network is used to collect measurements and issue control commands to
the power grid. In the smart grid models, if there is a NP ↔ NC connection at Node i and
there is a valid path from i to the network’s centrally located control center, then the control
system is able to collect measurements from the network, such as data about the flows on
overloaded transmission lines. Similarly, sources or sinks at Node j can be controlled only if
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there is a valid path from j through NC to the control center. Now, instead of a component
failing quickly after an overload occurs, measurements can be collected and used to choose
optimal control actions (rapid reductions in nodal supply or demand) that could mitigate
propagation of the cascade. Once chosen these decisions are distributed through NC to the
appropriate nodes in NP .
In the first of three variants on this model, the “Ideal Smart Grid,” we assume that
communication nodes continue to operate, even if nodes in NP fail. This corresponds to
the case where NC has highly reliable battery backup systems that allow it to continue to
operate when power failures occur, as is common practice in the design of modern SCADA
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems.
In our second variant, “Non-ideal Smart Grid,” communication nodes fail with a proba-
bility that is proportional to the amount of local load shedding.For example, if Node i in NP
has had to shed 50% of its local load, Node i in NC will fail with a 0.5 probability. Since
the possibility exists for communication node failures, nodes in NP will lose the ability to
be monitored and controlled if there ceases to be a functional communications network path
between the control center and a particular grid node. If communication node/edge failures
cause NC to fracture into clusters, signals can only pass within the cluster where the control
center is located (see Figure 3).
Finally, in our third variant, the “Vulnerable Smart Grid,” generators and loads at
node i fail immediately when there the corresponding communication Node i fails, if there is
a NP ↔ NC connection at i. This is the most pessimistic of the three models, and diverges
substantially from industry design standards which seek to minimize the chance that power
failures will cause communication failures, and vice versa.
To build semi-realistic coupled network topologies, we used the data for the Polish power
grid for NP and connected a fraction q of the n nodes to a communication network NC .
Because both power and communication networks are geographically embedded, NP and NC
are likely to be somewhat, but not perfectly, correlated. To approximate this correlation, NC
was initialized to be identical toNP , and then 10% of the edges inNC were randomly rewired.
After initializing the data and models, the various models were, as before, subjected to
random node failures, and the performance of the networks measured. For the Coupled
Topological results, we measured network performance using the giant component probabil-
ity Pr(|GC| > 0.5n). For the power grid models, we measured both Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) and an
analogous measure of performance: the probability that the network can serve at least 50%
of the load in the network, after the cascade has subsided, Pr(PT > 0.5P0). (see Statistical
Analysis).
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Figure 4 shows the results for fixed failure sizes, f = 0.05, and varying levels of coupling, q.
For q = 0 (i.e., uncoupled networks), the smart grid models produce results that are identical
to the uncontrolled power grid, since cascading occurs only within the power grid and the
communication network neither benefits nor detriments the system. As q increases, the
robustness of the Ideal and Non-ideal Smart Grid models increase monotonically. For the
Vulnerable Smart Grid model, robustness decreases monotonically with q. In contrast, for
the Coupled Topological model, robustness decreases monotonically with q; the “optimal”
level of coupling is q = 0 for all initiating failure sizes, f . It is interesting to note that the
results from both types of model contrast with the results in (18), which suggest that there
exists an optimal level of coupling between q = 0 and q = 1. In all of these cases optimal
performance results at either q = 0 or q = 1.
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Figure 4: Robustness of the Polish network to random failures, with vary-
ing levels of coupling, q. Panel (A) shows results from four different models
of cascading in power grids, three of which are coupled to communications
systems, after 5% of nodes initially failed (f = 0.05). In this case we
measured robustness with the fraction load served after the cascade had
subsided (PT ). Panel (B) reports analogous results from the coupled topo-
logical model, for several different failure sizes, with robustness measured
as in Figure 2.
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In order to compare the Non-ideal Smart Grid model to the Coupled Topological model
in more detail for different types of topological structures, we took the four additional net-
work topologies from Figure 2, and connected them to correlated communication networks,
using the same method used with the Polish power network. Both models, for q = 1, were
subsequently subjected to random node failures as before, measuring the robustness of the
networks to different disturbance sizes (with varying f).
Figure 5 shows the results. In all five networks, the Coupled Topological model indicates
that interdependency increases vulnerability relative to the simple contagion model. For
the Non-ideal Smart Grid model, interdependency decreases vulnerability in every network,
relative to the uncoupled Power Grid model in Figure 2.
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Figure 5: Robustness of fully coupled networks, q = 1, to random failures
in the (A) Coupled Topological cascading model and in the (B) Non-ideal
Smart Grid model.
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Discussion
Together, these results have important implications both for the emerging science of inter-
dependent networks and for the design of intelligent infrastructure systems.
Firstly, the power grid and topological models show several important qualitative simi-
larities. The relative vulnerability of the different network structures to random failures is
similar across the various models studied in this paper. Lattices are consistently the most
vulnerable and scale-free networks are consistently the most robust; power grids perform
only slightly better than lattice topologies. This indicates that topological structure does
have an important impact on the vulnerability of power networks, and that some aspects of
this impact are captured in simple topological models of cascading.
However, this is where the similarities end. When we measured the effect of network
coupling on performance, increased coupling consistently increased network robustness in all
but the most extreme (and unrealistic) power grid model. For the Ideal and Non-ideal Smart
Grid models, the most robust configuration was the fully coupled case, q = 1. In the Coupled
Topological model, q = 0 was the optimal level of coupling, and robustness monotonically
decreased with increased coupling. For every attack size, and every topological structure,
interdependency increased vulnerability in the coupled topological model and decreased vul-
nerability in the more realistic smart grid models. The reason that vulnerability decreased in
the smart grid models is that interconnections between the two networks performed valuable
functions in arresting the spread of cascades. When components were overloaded, and thus
at risk of cascading, the communication network facilitated valuable system-wide control
functions. Since these beneficial functions of the communication network are not modeled
in the coupled topological model, coupling tends to increase vulnerability. These differences
indicate that models of network interdependency can lead to misleading conclusions if they
do not adequately describe the beneficial functions of coupling in addition to modeling the
various mechanisms by which cascades can propagate between the coupled systems.
Finally, the results suggest good design practices for intelligent cyber-physical systems,
such as smart grid technology. In the case of the Ideal and Non-ideal Smart Grid mod-
els, increased coupling was beneficial because of the limited ways in which cascades could
propagate between the two networks. In practice, limits on inter-network cascades can be
implemented by sound engineering practices that reduce the chance of failures propagating
between networks. Adding reliable, well-maintained backup power systems to critical compo-
nents is a well-known strategy for reducing harmful interdependency. Most modern SCADA
communications systems used in modern power systems have a battery backup power source.
Another example of a useful decoupling strategy is to add battery backup to traffic signals
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along critical transportation corridors to reduce coupling between power and transportation
networks (32).
Materials and Methods
Experimental Design
This section provides detailed descriptions of the assumptions underlying our two experi-
ments. To summarize: the objective of Experiment One was to understand how different
topological structures respond to random failures, given different models of cascading failure
propagation. The objective of Experiment Two was to compare the network vulnerability,
given different models of how cascades propagate between a communications and a power
network. In both cases we were particularly interested to understand similarities and differ-
ences between the vulnerability implications of simple topological models and models that
more realistically describe the physics of flows in a power grid.
Network topological data
In this study, five different topological structures were studied. Power network data came
from a model of the Polish power grid that is publicly available with MATPOWER (30).
This model has n = 2383 nodes (buses) andm = 2886 edges (transmission lines or transform-
ers), after removing parallel edges. For comparison, four synthetic networks were generated
according to the standard Erdős-Rényi (ER) (33), random regular (RR) (34), preferential
attachment (scale-free, SF) (35), and square lattice attachment kernels (36). In order to
ensure that the synthetic graphs had the same size as the power network, we randomly re-
moved edges from the initial topological configurations as needed to produce graphs with
the correct size. Edge removals that would result in the graph separating into non-connected
subgraphs were avoided in order to ensure that the pre-disturbance graphs were fully con-
nected. Similarly, duplicate edges and self-loops were removed for consistency with the power
grid data.
Generating synthetic power grid data
After building graphs that were identical in size to the 2383-node Polish power grid, we gen-
erated synthetic power grid data for each of the synthetic graphs. In order locate sources and
sinks within the synthetic networks, each of the generators and loads in the Polish network
was randomly assigned to one node in each network. In addition each edge (transmission
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line) i↔ j was given a normalized impedance of 1, such that the power flowing from i to j,
after our linearized dc power flow assumptions (SM Text), was Pij = θi − θj, where θx is
the phase angle of the sinusoidal voltage at node x. Flow limits on each transmission line
were determined by taking the flow limits from with the original Polish network data and
randomly assigning each limit to one of the links in the synthetic network. After this was
done the line limits were increased as needed to ensure that no single line outage would result
in a cascading failure, as is common practice in power systems.
Generating communications network topologies
Geographically correlated communication network, NC , data were generated as follows.
First, we made a copy of the corresponding power network such that NC = NP . Then,
we randomly rewired 10% of the endpoints in NC , excluding rewirings that would self-loops
or duplicate edges. Then nodes in the two parallel networks were interconnected. Specifi-
cally, node i in NP was connected to node i in NC with probability q ∈ [0, 1]. The resulting
interlinks produce a correlated pair of graphs (as illustrated in Figure 3), which are at least
somewhat similar to the correlated topologies found in real power and communication net-
works.
Modeling cascading failures in power grids
Our model of cascading failure in power systems (DCSIMSEP) is based on the model in (31),
and is similar to models in (4,37,38), which are subsequently closely related to the random
fuse networks studied in (39). In this model power flows are computed using the dc power
flow equations (SM Text). The dc model can be summarized as follows:
PG −PD = Bθ (1)
fij =
1
xij
(θi − θj) (2)
where PG and PD are vectors of power generation and load; B is a weighted Laplacian matrix
that encodes the network’s topology; θ is a vector of voltage phase angles; Fij is the power
flow from node i to j; and xij is the (normalized) inductance of the transmission line. When
a component fails, flows are re-computed according to eqs. (1) and (2). If the revised power
flows exceed the flow capacity, this line will open (disconnect) in an amount of time that is
proportional to the overload. This changes the configuration of the network (changing B),
causing the flows to be re-computed. If the network separates into islands, there may not
exist a feasible solution to eq. (1) due to an imbalance between supply and demand. To
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correct this imbalance, a combination of generator adjustments and load reductions are used
to arrive at a new, feasible solution of eq. (1).
Smart Grid Models
The three smart grid models each depend on an optimization problem that identifies control
actions (load shedding and generator reductions) in order to mitigate overloads on trans-
mission lines. This problem seeks to minimize the amount of load shedding and power
generation reductions necessary to arrive at a feasible solution to eqs. (1) and (2), with the
added (soft) constraint that each flow fij should be within the flow capacity limits for this
link. The optimization proceeds as follows. In the three smart grid models, we located a
“control center” at the node in NC with the highest betweenness centrality. Then, after each
1 minute of simulation time, the control center collects measurement data (power flows as
well as generator and load states) from all of the nodes for which there exists a connected
path between the control center and that node. LetM represent this set of measurable nodes
and edges, M represent the unmeasurable nodes, fM represent the vector of measured power
flows, PG,M represent the vector of measured generator states, and PD,M represent the vector
of measured load states. For the Ideal Smart Grid model, fM , PG,M , and PD,M are always
full vectors of all measurements from nodes that have communication network connectivity
(given q). Depending on the level of coupling q and the state of the communication network
NC , these may be sub-vectors of all possible measurements. After the control center gathers
measurements fM through the communication system, it solves the following optimization
problem:
minimize
∆PD,∆PG
−1>∆PD + λ> fover (3)
subject to ∆PG −∆PD = B∆θ (4)
∆θi = 0, ∀i ∈ Ωref (5)
∆fij =
1
xij
(∆θi −∆θj), ∀ij ∈M (6)
|fM + ∆f | ≤ fmax + fover (7)
fover ≥ 0 (8)
−PG,M ≤ ∆PG,M ≤ 0 (9)
−PD,M ≤ ∆PD,M ≤ 0 (10)
∆PG,M = 0, ∆PD,M = 0 (11)
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The objective for this problem (eq. (3)) is to minimize the total amount of load shed-
ding (−1>∆PD) plus the weighted sum of all overloads that cannot be eliminated through
changes to generators and loads (λ> fover). For this work, we set λ to be uniform weight
vector such that each λi = 100 (in normalized units). Constraint (4) enforces that the net
changes to nodal power injections (∆PG − ∆PD) must be equal to the changes in power
flowing out through transmission lines (B∆θ). Constraint (5) fixes one voltage phase an-
gle θ in each connected component of the network as a reference; Ωref represents this set of
reference nodes. Constraint (6) computes the changes in flow on each of the measured trans-
mission lines. Eq. (7) attempts to limit the post-optimization power flows (fM + ∆f) to be
below the flow limits, fmax. The vector fover in eqs. (3) and (7) turns the flow constraint into
a soft constraint, which alleviates the problem of occasionally infeasible cases, particularly
when the system is very heavily stressed. fover is constrained to be non-negative in eq. (8).
Constraints (9) and (10) ensure that the system exclusively reduces load and generation at
measured nodes (M) in its attempt to eliminate overloads on transmission lines. Finally,
eq. (11) forces the system to not change load or generator at nodes that are not accessible
from the control center (M). Note that the assumptions used in this model are similar to
those presented in (29).
Each of the three Smart Grid models makes use of this optimization problem in a slightly
different way. The Ideal Smart Grid model uses perfect information about all communication-
connected nodes to solve this problem, optimally choosing adjustments to the available gener-
ators and loads, independent of where they are in the network. If there is no communication
link to a particular node, the Ideal Smart Grid model does not gather data about flows from
this location, and assumes that it has no ability to control generators or loads at this node.
Thus, the topology of NC does not impact the ideal model.
The Non-ideal Smart Grid model, however, does rely on the state of the communication
network. The optimizer can only control and monitor nodes when there is aNC path between
a particular grid node and the control center node. When the path to Node i is broken, the
optimization formulation is adapted to exclude generation and load at Node i from the set
of control variables, and it ignores the flow constraints adjacent to i (e.g., the flow constraint
on Edge i → j), unless an adjacent node (e.g., j) is connected to the control center. In
addition, the non-ideal model assumes that if there is load shedding at grid node i, the
adjacent communication node will fail with probability that is equal to the fraction of load
shedding.
The Vulnerable Smart Grid Model adds to this the rather extreme assumption that if a
communication node fails, the generation and load at that node will also fail.
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Statistical Analysis
Measuring the initiating failure size
Note that our measure of attack size f , as shown in Figures 2, 4, and 5, is the complement
of the notation used in (19) and in a number of other papers on percolation networks. In
our notation, f represents the size of the initiating attack (or random failure). In (19), the
complement is used, in which p represents the fraction of the n nodes in each network that
remain in service immediately after an initial, random set of f =∼ (1 − p)n node failures.
f was used, rather than p, for clarity of presentation, particularly for readers who are less
familiar with the percolation literature.
Measuring robustness, sample size
Note that our measure of robustness Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) differs slightly from the traditional p∞
measure, which is commonly used in the percolation literature and which averages GC sizes
across a set of samples. Since power networks are small, relative to (for example) ther-
modynamic systems, the underlying rationale for p∞ is less robust. In our judgement,
the Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) measure more clearly presented the results. However, we computed
results using both metrics and found that the p∞ measure led one to the same conclusions as
reported in this paper. See the SM Text for a comparison of the results with Pr(|GC| > 0.5n)
and p∞.
In this paper, each estimate of Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) comes from the simulation of 1000
random initiating disturbances of size f and counting the number of cases that result in
a cascade with the end-state largest connected component containing at least 0.5n nodes.
This sample size (1000) was found to provide a reasonable balance between variance in this
statistic and computational requirements, which were substantial given the more detailed
nature of our models. To compute the variance, we used standard bootstrapping methods
and found the standard deviation of Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) to be almost universally less than 0.01.
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S.1 DC Power-Flow Model
In this paper, we made use of the “dc power flow” linearization of the full non-linear power
flow equations in our model of cascading failures. Here, we briefly describe the derivation
of this common, although imperfect, simplification. For a more detailed discussion of the dc
power flow equations and their limitations, see (40,41).
Consider a node (“bus” in power systems terminology) f that is connected to node t via
a transmission line, which has series resistance rft and reactance xft = ωlft, where ω is the
frequency of the sinusoidal current and lft is the series inductance of the line. r and x can be
combined to form a complex impedance zft = rft + jxft, in which (by electrical engineering
notational tradition) j =
√−1. The inverse of this impedance is known as an “admittance,”
and is defined as follows: 1/zft = yft = gft + jbft, where g and b are known, respectively, as
the conductance and susceptance of the line. The sinusoidal voltages at nodes f and t will
each have an amplitude (V ) and a phase shift (θ, relative to some reference), and can thus
be represented with complex numbers V˜f = Vfejθf and V˜t = Vtejθt . With these definitions,
we can define the complex current I˜ and power S˜ flowing out from f to t as:
I˜ft = yft(V˜f − V˜t) (S.1)
S˜ft = V˜fI
∗
ft = V˜f (V˜
∗
f − V˜ ∗t )y∗ft (S.2)
where x∗ indicates the complex conjugate of x. With some manipulation of eqs. (S.1) and
(S.2), we can find the active (P ) and reactive (Q) power flowing from f to t as follows:
Pft = V
2
f gft − VfVt(gft cos θft + bft sin θft) (S.3)
Qft = −V 2f bft − VfVt(gft sin θft − bft cos θft) (S.4)
where θft = θf − θt is the phase angle difference between f and t. If we assume that the
voltage amplitudes Vf and Vt are at their nominal levels, that we have normalized yft such
that this nominal level is 1.0 (common practice), and that the resistance rft is small (nearly
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zero) relative to the reactance xft (a reasonable assumption for bulk power systems), then
gft ∼= 0, and Pft becomes:
Pft ∼= −bft sin θft = 1
xft
sin θft (S.5)
If we assume that θft is small, then sin θft ∼= θft and we get:
Pft ∼= 1
xft
θft (S.6)
If we furthermore assume that Qft = 0 (not a particularly good assumption), then the
current magnitude and the power are equal, |Ift| = Pft, and we can use eq. (S.6) to roughly
simulate power flows in a power system.
In order to solve for the flows Pft in simulation, we put eq. (S.6) into matrix form as
follows. Let A denote the line-to-node incidence matrix with 1 and -1 in each row indicating
the endpoints of each line, θ be the vector of voltage phase angles, X be a diagonal matrix of
line reactances, and Pflow be a vector of active power flows along transmission lines. Then,
we can solve for the vector of power flows Pflow given that we know the vector of voltage
phase angles θ as shown in the following:
A>θ = XPflow (S.7)
Pflow =
[
X−1A>
]
θ (S.8)
In order to solve for θ, we use information about the sources (generators) and sinks (loads)
to build a vector of net injected powers (generation minus load), P. Given P, we can solve
the following to find θ:
P = APflow =
[
AX−1A>
]
θ = Bθ (S.9)
The matrix B is known as the bus susceptance matrix, and has the properties of a weighted
graph Laplacian matrix describing the network of transmission lines, where the link weights
are the susceptances bft = 1/xft.
S.2 Supplemental results
S.2.1 Comparing Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) to p∞
In this paper, we measured the impact of disturbances of various sizes, f , on the probability
of at least half of the network remaining within the “giant component” after the resulting
cascade had subsided Pr(|GC| > 0.5n), or the probability of half of the load still being served
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after the cascade completed: Pr(PT > 0.5P0). An alternative way to measure the impact
of the disturbances is to measure the average cascade size (sometimes known as the yield),
rather than the probability of a cascade in a given size range. This measure would be more
analogous to the p∞ metric that is commonly used in the literature on phase transitions in
percolation systems. We chose not to use p∞ as our primary measure of network robustness
since the modeling assumptions described in the above discussion of “dc power flow” become
particularly inaccurate for very large cascades. Essentially, p∞ would, in many cases, average
over small numbers that were not particular accurate.
However, the results that one obtains by measuring the average cascade impact do not
lead one to substantially different conclusions than those reported in the paper (aside from
the fact that the transitions are much more gradual).
Figure S.1 compares the response of various networks to random failures using the p∞
and Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) measures for the topological contagion and power grid models. For
the power grid model, the relative robustness of the five network structures is unchanged.
The lattice is the most vulnerable and the scale-free network is the most robust. In the
topological model, the p∞ measure indicates that the power grid, random graph, random
regular, and scale-free networks have similar levels of robustness, for f < 0.15. The lattice
remains to be the most vulnerable of the five network structures.
Figure S.2 compares the response of various coupled models to random failures with
different levels of coupling between the power and communications network. In this case, we
compare the original metrics used in the paper (Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) and Pr(PT > 0.5P0)) to
p∞. Our analogous measure of robustness for the four Power/Smart Grid models is PT/P0:
the ratio of the amount of load connected at the end of the cascade to the original load.
The results for the four different (smart) power grid models are not substantially changed.
We still see that increased coupling increases robustness in both the Ideal and the Non-Ideal
Smart Grid models, whereas coupling is detrimental (though only slightly) in the Vulnerable
SG model. For the Coupled Topological model, coupling is detrimental to robustness; indeed,
by measuring the results using both p∞ and Pr(|GC| > 0.5n), the decrease in performance
with q is monotonic.
S.2.2 Comparisons among the various models
For ease of comparison among the six different models considered in this paper, Figure S.3
compares the robustness, measured using Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) for all six models. For the coupled
network models, these results show the fully coupled case, q = 1.
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Figure S.1: The response of a simple model of topological contagion (A,
C) and our power grid model (B, D) to random node failures. Panels A
and B show the response using the Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) measure used in the
paper. Panels C and D show the response using the average size of the
post-cascade giant component, p∞.
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Figure S.2: The robustness of the Polish power grid topology, when coupled
to a communication network, for two different models and two different
measures of robustness, as a function of the level of inter-network coupling,
q. Panels A and C show results for the four power grid models, whereas
B and D show the Coupled Topological model. Panels A and B measure
robustness using the Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) and Pr(PT > 0.5P0) measures, as in
the main paper, whereas C and D use measures that are more analogous
to p∞.
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Figure S.3: Comparison of the robustness for all six of the models considered
in this paper: (A) single-network, topological cascading, (B) single-network,
power-flow-based cascading, (C) ideal smart grid, (D) non-ideal smart grid,
(E) vulnerable smart grid, and (F) coupled topological cascading. In all of
the coupled models the grid and communication nodes are assumed to be
perfectly coupled, i.e., q = 1.
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S.2.3 50% coupling results
To better understand the impact of the level of coupling, we re-computed the results shown
in Figure S.3 using 50% coupling q = 0.5.
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Figure S.4: Comparison of robustness results for the four coupled network
models, with 50% coupling, q = 0.5, for the: (A) ideal smart grid model,
(B) non-ideal smart grid model, (C) vulnerable smart grid model, and (D)
Coupled topological cascading model.
S.2.4 Network Vulnerability Indices
One way to compare the various topological configurations and models described in this
paper is to convert the sigmoidal results shown in Figures S.3 and S.4 into a single metric
of robustness (or conversely, vulnerability). To quantify the effects of topology, physics, and
coupling among different synthetic networks, we define the following network vulnerability
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index (β) as follows:
β = − log
∫ 1
0
PrGC(f) df (S.10)
≈ − log
{
1
2L
L−1∑
`=1
PrGC(f`) + PrGC(f`+1)
}
(S.11)
where f is the initiating failure size; L is the total number of f values simulated; and
PrGC = Pr(|GC| > 0.5n) is the probability of observing a GC whose size is more than half
the number of grid nodes.
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Figure S.5: Network vulnerability indices, β for different models of cascad-
ing for the fully coupled (q = 1.0), and half coupled (q = 0.5) cases. Panel
A shows the simple topological cascading model; B shows the uncoupled
power grid; C, D and E show the three smart grid models; and F shows the
Coupled Topological model.
25
References
1. C. D. Brummitt, P. D. H. Hines, I. Dobson, C. Moore, R. M. D’Souza, Transdisciplinary
electric power grid science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, 12159–
12159 (2013).
2. S. M. Rinaldi, J. P. Peerenboom, T. K. Kelly, Identifying, understanding, and analyzing
critical infrastructure interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21, 11–25
(2001).
3. M. G. Morgan, et al., The many meanings of “smart grid”, Briefing , Carnegie Mellon
University (2009).
4. I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras, V. E. Lynch, D. E. Newman, Complex systems analysis of
series of blackouts: Cascading failure, critical points, and self-organization. Chaos: An
Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science 17, 026103 (2007).
5. D. Von Dollen, Report to NIST on the smart grid interoperability standards roadmap.
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (2009).
6. D. Wei, Y. Lu, M. Jafari, P. M. Skare, K. Rohde, Protecting smart grid automation
systems against cyberattacks. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 2, 782–795 (2011).
7. N. T. J. Bailey, The mathematical theory of infectious diseases and its applications
(Hafner Press, 1975).
8. D. J. Watts, A simple model of global cascades on random networks. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 99, 5766–5771 (2002).
9. J. Leskovec, L. Backstrom, J. Kleinberg, Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD Inter-
national Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (2009), pp. 497–506.
10. R. Albert, H. Jeong, A.-L. Barabási, Error and attack tolerance of complex networks.
Nature 406, 378–382 (2000).
11. C. Magnien, M. Latapy, J.-L. Guillaume, Impact of random failures and attacks on pois-
son and power-law random networks. ACM Computing Surveys 43, 13:1–13:31 (2011).
12. A. Asztalos, S. Sreenivasan, B. K. Szymanski, G. Korniss, Cascading failures in spatially-
embedded random networks. PloS One 9, e84563 (2014).
26
13. A. E. Motter, Y.-C. Lai, Cascade-based attacks on complex networks. Physical Review
E 66, 065102 (2002).
14. D. P. Chassin, C. Posse, Evaluating North American electric grid reliability using the
Barabási–Albert network model. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
355, 667–677 (2005).
15. H. Xiao, E. M. Yeh, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops
(ICC) (2011).
16. C. M. Schneider, N. Yazdani, N. A. M. Araújo, S. Havlin, H. J. Herrmann, Towards
designing robust coupled networks. Scientific Reports 3 (2013).
17. P. Hines, E. Cotilla-Sanchez, S. Blumsack, Do topological models provide good informa-
tion about electricity infrastructure vulnerability? Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal
of Nonlinear Science 20, 033122 (2010).
18. C. D. Brummitt, R. M. D’Souza, E. A. Leicht, Suppressing cascades of load in interde-
pendent networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, E680–E689
(2012).
19. S. V. Buldyrev, R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, S. Havlin, Catastrophic cascade of
failures in interdependent networks. Nature 464, 1025–1028 (2010).
20. A. Bashan, Y. Berezin, S. V. Buldyrev, S. Havlin, The extreme vulnerability of interde-
pendent spatially embedded networks. Nature Physics 9, 667–672 (2013).
21. J. Gao, S. V. Buldyrev, S. Havlin, H. E. Stanley, Robustness of a network of networks.
Physical Review Letters 107, 195701 (2011).
22. D. T. Nguyen, Y. Shen, M. T. Thai, Detecting critical nodes in interdependent power
networks for vulnerability assessment. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 4, 151–159
(2013).
23. S. D. S. Reis, et al., Avoiding catastrophic failure in correlated networks of networks.
Nature Physics (2014).
24. L. Dueñas-Osorio, S. M. Vemuru, Cascading failures in complex infrastructure systems.
Structural Safety 31, 157–167 (2009).
27
25. E. Cotilla-Sanchez, P. D. H. Hines, C. Barrows, S. Blumsack, Comparing the topological
and electrical structure of the North American electric power infrastructure. IEEE
Systems Journal 6, 616–626 (2012).
26. M. T. Gastner, M. E. J. Newman, The spatial structure of networks. The European
Physical Journal B – Condensed Matter and Complex Systems 49, 247–252 (2006).
27. W. Chen, et al., Phase transitions in supercritical explosive percolation. Physical Review
E 87, 052130 (2013).
28. M. Rahnamay-Naeini, M. M. Hayat, 2013 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Infor-
mation Processing (GlobalSIP) (2013), pp. 527–530.
29. M. Parandehgheibi, E. Modiano, D. Hay, Proc. SmartGridComm 2014 (Venice, Italy,
2014), p. arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.2866.
30. R. D. Zimmerman, C. E. Murillo-Sánchez, R. J. Thomas, MATPOWER: Steady-state
operations, planning, and analysis tools for power systems research and education. IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems 26, 12–19 (2011).
31. M. J. Eppstein, P. D. H. Hines, A ‘random chemistry’ algorithm for identifying collections
of multiple contingencies that initiate cascading failure. IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems 27, 1698–1705 (2012).
32. S. N. Talukdar, J. Apt, M. Ilic, L. B. Lave, M. G. Morgan, Cascading failures: Survival
versus prevention. The Electricity Journal 16, 25–31 (2003).
33. P. Erdős, A. Rényi, On random graphs. Publicationes Mathematicae Debrecen 6, 290–297
(1959).
34. B. Bollobás, Random Graphs , Graduate Texts in Mathematics (Springer, New York,
1998).
35. A.-L. Barabási, R. Albert, Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286,
509–512 (1999).
36. W. Li, A. Bashan, S. V. Buldyrev, H. E. Stanley, S. Havlin, Cascading failures in inter-
dependent lattice networks: The critical role of the length of dependency links. Physical
Review Letters 108, 228702 (2012).
28
37. R. Pfitzner, K. Turitsyn, M. Chertkov, Proceedings of IEEE Power and Energy Society
General Meeting (2011), pp. 1–8.
38. A. Bernstein, D. Bienstock, D. Hay, M. Uzunoglu, G. Zussman, Proceedings of IEEE
INFOCOM 2014 (2014), pp. 2634–2642.
39. L. De Arcangelis, S. Redner, H. J. Herrmann, A random fuse model for breaking pro-
cesses. Journal de Physique Lettres 46, 585–590 (1985).
40. B. Stott, J. Jardim, O. Alsac, DC power flow revisited. IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems 24, 1290 - 1300 (2009).
41. A. Gómez-Expósito, A. J. Conejo, C. E. Cañizares, Electric energy systems: analysis
and operation (CRC Press, Baco Raton, FL, 2009).
29
